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Abstract We address the question of whether it is possible to operate a time machine
by manipulating matter and energy so as to manufacture closed timelike curves. This
question has received a great deal of attention in the physics literature, with attempts
to prove no-go theorems based on classical general relativity and various hybrid the-
ories serving as steps along the way towards quantum gravity. Despite the effort put
into these no-go theorems, there is no widely accepted definition of a time machine.
We explain the conundrum that must be faced in providing a satisfactory definition
and propose a resolution. Roughly, we require that all extensions of the time machine
region contain closed timelike curves; the actions of the time machine operator are then
sufficiently “potent” to guarantee that closed timelike curves appear. We then review
no-go theorems based on classical general relativity, semi-classical quantum gravity,
quantum field theory on curved spacetime, and Euclidean quantum gravity. Our ver-
dict on the question of our title is that no result of sufficient generality to underwrite
a confident “yes” has been proven. Our review of the no-go results does, however,
highlight several foundational problems at the intersection of general relativity and
quantum physics that lend substance to the search for an answer.
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1 Introduction
The twin topics of time travel and time machines continue to exert a hold on the pop-
ular imagination. (Recent popularizations include the books by Davies (2002), Gott
(2001), and Randles (2005). The science section of the New York Times occasionally
runs articles on time travel and time machines; see Overbye (2005).) The philosophical
literature records a steady trickle and occasional spikes of articles on the these topics.
(Volume 88, number 3 of the Monist (2005) is devoted to the topic of time travel.) And
Visser (2003) estimates that as of that date the physics literature contained over two
hundred articles on time travel and time machines, most of them of recent vintage.1 The
popular literature can hardly be faulted for its simplifications and enthusiasms since its
purpose is fire the imagination rather than dull it with details and qualms. The philo-
sophical literature, however, is another story. It has focused in part on analyzing the
“grandfather paradox” and related issues. We find fault with this literature in that, first,
it often fails to identify distinctive problems related to time travel, rather than re-pack-
aging the conflict between free will and determinism. Second, it is unclear what a time
traveller’s inability to kill Grandpa implies regarding the physical possibility or plausi-
bility of time travel. There are certainly subtle and interesting issues regarding modality
here, but (as we hope to illustrate below) philosophers have more to gain from a study
of how time travel has been handled in the physics literature than from continued
analysis of the grandfather paradox.2 In addition, philosophers have largely neglected
the distinctive issues raised by the physics literature on time machines. These issues
are independent of the time travel paradoxes since they are concerned with attempts
to establish–or evade–“no-go” results for time machines that focus on what happens
before closed timelike curves (CTCs) are formed. This is not to say that the physics lit-
erature is unproblematic. For one thing, a reader will search this literature in vain for a
satisfactory definition of “time machine” in terms of spacetime structure.3 For reasons
to be explained below, this is less scandalous than it sounds. But there is obviously a
task here that calls for the kind of analysis that is stock-in-trade for philosophy.
The central issue to be discussed here can be simply, if crudely, posed: Do the laws
of physics allow the operation of a time machine, a device that produces CTCs? If
the answer is negative and the reasons have to do with what happens before the CTCs
are produced, then issues surrounding the paradoxes of time travel do not have to be
1 There are also various works on time travel and time machines that lie somewhere in between the popular
science literature and the technical physics literature; see, for example, Hawking et al. (2002) and Nahin
(1999).
2 A notable exception to our negative diagnosis of the philosophical literature is Arntzenius and Maudlin
(2005).
3 Our complaint is not that a “functional” definition is lacking—a TM is a device that produces CTCs—
but rather that there is not a standard definition of a TM in terms of spacetime structure, where the latter
definition is needed to prove no-go theorems. Our thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting this
clarification.
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confronted. But any attempt to give a positive answer cannot avoid taking a stance on
these paradoxes. Our stance, as explained in Sect. 2, is that these paradoxes are not
genuine antinomies but simply counterintuitive results that do not threaten either the
conceptual coherency or the physical possibility of time travel. At the same time we try
to diagnose why the air of paradox is so difficult to dispel. Section 3 surveys attempts to
give necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the operation of time machines within
the setting of relativistic spacetimes. We reject various key conditions that appear
frequently in the physics literature, and we show why it is so difficult to specify an
interesting sense in which a device operating in a relativistic spacetime can be said to
be responsible for the development of CTCs. Although the most straightforward way
of cashing out “responsible for” is blocked, we introduce a “potency condition” that we
argue is the next best thing. The analysis in Sect. 3 deals with how such responsibility
can be cashed out exclusively in terms of the causal structure of spacetime. The conse-
quences of specific dynamical laws are not considered until later sections, and various
spacetimes are considered in Sect. 3 that may not qualify as physically possible. But
an analysis at this general level has the distinct merit of being more fundamental and
thus applicable to all the different theories with all the different dynamics discussed
in the remaining sections of the paper. In the light of this discussion and the potency
condition we review in Sects. 4–7 purported no-go results for time machines, as well
as more general “chronology protection” results, that come from the classical general
theory of relativity (GTR), semi-classical quantum gravity, quantum field theory on
curved spacetime, and Euclidean quantum gravity.
Our discussion of these results is motivated by two more general philosophical
concerns, beyond their bearing on the question at hand. The first is that delimiting
the content of a theory involves judgments regarding what qualifies as “physically
reasonable,” and the status of such judgments is a more interesting issue than philos-
ophers have generally realized. In this case, the question is whether the vast array of
spacetime structures allowed in GTR can be trimmed down by considering solutions
that correspond to “reasonable” choices of physical fields populating spacetimes. We
explore various ways of cashing out “reasonableness,” from imposing energy condi-
tions to formulating prerequisites a spacetime must satisfy to admit a quantum field
theory (QFT). Our second motivation for considering these results is that they highlight
the importance of “hybrid” theories and how they are employed. The no-go results
reviewed in Sects. 5–7 all rely on different combinations of QFT and GTR, none of
which constitute a fully satisfactory theory of quantum gravity. But physicists expect
that exploring the no-go theorems will allow them to probe the reliability of different
parts of each theory, and give some indication of what should carry over to a theory
of quantum gravity. Our conclusions are presented in Sect. 8.
2 Time travel and its paradoxes
We will not review here the various different senses of “time travel.”4 And we will
ignore those versions of time travel that exploit abnormal worldlines in a spacetime
4 See Earman (1995) and Earman and Wüthrich (2004) for taxonomies and further discussion.
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that possesses a bland causal structure, such as Newtonian or Minkowski spacetime.
By an “abnormal worldline” we mean, for example, a discontinuous world line that
represents an observer who pops out of existence in 2008 and then pops back into
existence in 1492, or a continuous worldline that bends backwards in time.5 We will
be concerned exclusively with the sense of time travel that uses worldlines that do
not involve either of these pathologies but which, nevertheless, are able to close on
themselves because they reside in a spacetime with an abnormal causal structure.
In more detail, we will be concerned with relativistic spacetimes, which by def-
inition consist of a differentiable manifold M and a Lorentz signature metric gab
defined on all of M. We are interested only in cases where the spacetime M, gab is
time orientable in the sense that it can be assigned a globally consistent time direction.
(Technically, this means that the spacetime admits a continuous non-vanishing time-
like vector field, implying that there is a continuous division of the lobes of the null
cones into “future lobe” and “past lobe.” This is a mild restriction since it can always
be satisfied by passing, if necessary, to a covering spacetime, as follows from the fact
that any simply connected spacetime is time orientable. Deciding which direction of
a time oriented spacetime deserves to be labeled “future” and which deserves to be
labeled “past” is part of the problem of the direction of time, which we do not try
to tackle here.) By a wordline we mean a continuous timelike curve which at each
point is assigned a temporal orientation that agrees with the time orientation of the
spacetime in which it is embedded. A CTC is then a closed worldline.
We are concerned here only with senses of time travel that can be explicated using
CTCs. The fans of science fiction stories on time travel may complain that our sense
of time travel is a cheat since it implies ipso facto that there is no normal time in which
the time traveler can “go backward,” for CTCs exist only for spacetimes that possess
a globally consistent time direction but not a globally consistent time order.6 They
may be able to introduce some other notion of “time” such that travelling backwards
makes sense in special cases, such as asymptotically flat spacetimes. (These space-
times approach flat Minkowski spacetime “far away ” from an isolated gravitational
source. The lack of a globally consistent time order does not rule out the existence
of an “asymptotic time” defined in terms of the additional structure of the asymptotic
region.7) However, this strategy does not work in general, and we will not discuss
such time travel scenarios further. We acknowledge this limitation of our approach,
5 Of course, the problem is to make sense of the “and then” and “bends backwards.”
6 For p, q ∈ M, gab define p  q (p chronologically precedes q) to hold iff there is a future directed
timelike curve from p to q. This relation is always transitive. But it will be irreflexive and anti-symmetric
iff the spacetime does not contain CTCs.
7 As an example of how a time travel scenario might work in such cases, consider a Deutsch-Politzer gate,
as illustrated in Fig. 5a, assuming that this acausal region can be embedded in an asymptotically flat space-
time. Our would-be time traveler could enter the gate “just before it closes” (the hypersurface connecting p1
with p3) and emerge from the “opening” of the gate (the hypersurface connecting p2 with p4) at an earlier
(asymptotic) time. Even in this example it is impossible to access asymptotic times prior to the formation of
the acausal region, ruling out some time travel scenarios. Furthermore, “topological censorship” theorems
due to Friedman, Schleich and Witt (1993) indicate that (given various assumptions) any timelike curve
that threads a region of complicated topology cannot return to the asymptotic region; if these theorems can
be extended to non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes, they would rule out such a time travel scenario.
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but we note that the trade-off for the loss of contact with the science fiction literature
is a gain in contact with the theories of modern physics.
In any case, for us the question “Is time travel possible?” is equivalent to the ques-
tion of whether a spacetime structure containing CTCs is physically possible. This
issue can be given two senses, corresponding to a weak and a strong sense of physical
possibility. Time travel will be said to be physically possible in the weak sense just in
case the laws L (of the actual world) are such that CTCs are compatible with L , or,
in possible worlds talk, just in case there is a possible world in which there are CTCs
and in which L are true. Time travel will be said to be physically possible in the strong
sense just in case the laws L (of the actual world) are such that there is a possible
world in which there are CTCs and in which L are not only true but are laws. If the
laws L are the laws of Einstein’s GTR, then time travel is physically possible in the
weak sense, for there are many known solutions to Einstein’s field equations which
satisfy various energy conditions,8 thought to be necessary for physically realistic
matter-energy sources, and which contain CTCs.
The issue of physical possibility in the strong sense is more delicate and contro-
versial because it turns on one’s conception of laws of nature. If, for example, one
wants an empiricist conception of laws on which the laws supervene on the occurrent
regularities, then the weak sense of physical possibility does not entail the strong
sense since lawhood is not necessarily transmitted down the chain of nomological
accessibility. Consider, for sake of illustration, David Lewis’s (1973) “best systems
analysis” of laws,9 and suppose that the best system for the actual world is axioma-
tized by the postulates of GTR. There is no guarantee that these postulates will be
among the axioms or theorems of the best system for a possible world that contains
CTCs and that satisfies these postulates. Nevertheless, we would be very surprised if
there were not some possible worlds that correspond to solutions to Einstein’s field
equations, that contain CTCs, and that return the laws of GTR when the best systems
analysis is applied to them. On other analyses of laws, such as Carroll’s (1994), the
present issue doesn’t arise since the weak sense of physical possibility entails the
strong sense. The price to be paid for obtaining this entailment is the failure of laws
to be Humean supervenient, a price we think is too high; but that is a topic for another
occasion.10
If it is so clear that time travel is physically possible in the weak sense and (probably)
also in the strong sense,11 what is one to make of the discussions in the philosophical
literature on the paradoxes of time travel, which are often taken to threaten the
conceptual coherency of time travel? The grandfather paradox is a staple of these
8 These energy conditions will be discussed below in Sect. 4.
9 Roughly, this view holds that the laws of a world W are given by the axioms or theorems of the best
deductive system for W . A deductive system for W is a deductively closed axiomatizable set of sentences,
all of which are true in W . The best such system is the one that achieves the best compromise between
strength (or information content) and simplicity.
10 A good overview of the different currently available accounts of laws of nature is found in J. W. Carroll
(2004).
11 At least as far as the laws of classical GTR are concerned. Adding quantum considerations may yield
a different verdict. But the angst about the paradoxes of time travel that is evident in the philosophical
literature does not derive from worry about an incompatibility of time travel with quantum physics.
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Fig. 1 (1 + 1)-dimensional Minkowski spacetime rolled up along the time axis
discussions—Kurt travels into his past, kills his grandfather before granddad sires
Kurt’s father, thus preventing Kurt from making the journey. We view such paradoxes
as a way of calling attention to a phenomenon long known to physicists; namely, in the
presence of CTCs, consistency constraints can arise for local physics that would be
absent in spacetimes with a tame global causal structure.12 Familiar laws of relativistic
physics are typically stated in terms of local differential equations, and as a result they
have a global-to-local property. Treat a spacetime M, gab as a fixed background on
which a field  propagates. (Here “field” is to be given a broad interpretation—it may
be a scalar, vector, or tensor field, and it may describe a system of discrete particles
as opposed to a continuum field.) The laws L governing  have the intended global-
to-local property iff for any global solution 〈M, gab,〉 and any open neighborhood
U ⊂ M, 〈U , gab|U ,|U 〉 is also a solution. If the causal structure of the background
spacetime M, gab is tame one would expect that the field also has the opposite local-
to-global property that any local solution 〈U , gab|U ,|U 〉 can be extended to a global
solution 〈M, gab,〉. But when CTCs pass through U (or more generally U is inter-
sected repeatedly by a future directed timelike curve) this local-to-global property can
fail. A trivial but instructive illustration is obtained by rolling up (1 + 1)-dimensional
Minkowski spacetime along the time axis (see Fig. 1). Let U be a thin sandwich about
the time slice . And consider on U a solution to the relativistic wave equation for
a scalar field  that corresponds to a single localized disturbance propagating to the
right.13 This local solution does not extend to any global solution on the cylinder
spacetime. If the spacetime of Fig. 1 is made into a donut by identifying points of the
space axis that are equal modulo π , then the only local solutions of the wave equation
on any open U ⊂ M that can be extended to a global solution are the trivial ones, i.e.
 = const .14
Both the philosophical and physics literature contain assertions to the effect that
there are no genuine paradoxes of time travel. If this is taken to mean that the grandfa-
ther paradox and its ilk do not demonstrate that time travel is logically, conceptually,
or physically absurd, then we agree wholeheartedly. For, to repeat, such paradoxes
12 We should emphasize that we are interested only in consistency constraints entailed by the combination
of local physical laws and global spacetime structure, and not with a broader notion of consistency (such
as classifying initial data that lead to the formation of a singularity as somehow “inconsistent”).
13 The wave equation states: ∇2 − ∂
2
∂t2
= 0, where units have been chosen so that c ≡ 1.
14 It has been conjectured, but not proved, that a similar triviality result holds for Gödel spacetime, which
has the property that there is a CTC through every point.
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simply illustrate the presence of consistency constraints on local physics in space-
times with CTCs; and the presence of such constraints do not show that CTCs are
physically impossible in either the strong or weak sense. But sometimes the assertion
that there are no genuine paradoxes of time travel is taken to mean that non-trivial
consistency constraints are absent (see, for example, Krasnikov 1997). In unqualified
terms, such assertions are patently false, as illustrated not only by the above artifi-
cial example but by many other examples of self-interacting and non-self-interacting
fields on a variety of general relativistic spacetimes with CTCs. There is, however, a
qualified sense in which this assertion points to an interesting truth.
Suppose that a spacetime M, gab contains a global time slice  (i.e., a spacelike
hypersurface with no edges).15 Irrespective of the global causal structure of M, gab,
the initial data on  for a relativistic field  may not be freely specifiable but must
satisfy a set of constraints C that follow from the laws L() governing . For exam-
ple, the source-free Maxwell equations for the electromagnetic field entail that the
electric and magnetic fields at “time”  are divergence free; similarly, initial data
for Einstein’s field equations must satisfy a pair (or triple) of constraint equations.
If  is intersected more than once by future directed timelike curves, then consis-
tency with L() will typically entail additional constraints on initial data over and
above C. But suppose that  is achronal (i.e. is not intersected more than once by a
future directed timelike curve), in which case  is called a partial Cauchy surface.16
Does the presence of a non-empty chronology violating region V ⊂ M (consisting
of all points p ∈ M such that a CTC passes through p)17 not intersecting  give
rise to consistency constraints over and above C in the sense that it is not true that,
given any initial data on  satisfying C, there is at least one solution of L() on all
of M, gab that agrees with the given data set on ?18 For fundamental fields—those
which admit a well-posed global initial value problem in Minkowski spacetime19—no
counterexamples are known to the conjecture that additional consistency constraints
do not arise. And a result of Krasnikov (2002), which will be discussed below, can
perhaps be adapted to prove this conjecture for a broad range of cases.
For future reference, however, note that a quantum mechanical treatment of this
issue may yield a different conclusion; indeed, there are a number of results to the
effect that for interacting fields, unitarity fails for the chronology violating region V
to the future (or past) of  (see Boulware 1992; Friedman et al. 1992; Politzer 1992).
There are various proposals for securing unitarity (see Deutsch 1991; Deutsch and
Lockwood 1994; Fewster and Wells 1995), but the security comes with a price tag.
15 Some spacetimes, such as Gödel spacetime, do not admit any global time slices. This is a consequence
of three features: it is time orientable; a CTC passes through each point; and it is simply connected. The
edge of an achronal surface S is the set of points p such that every open neighborhood O  p includes
points in I+(p) and I−(p) that can be connected by a timelike curve that does not cross S.
16 If  is a global time slice of a spacetime M, gab then it will become a partial Cauchy surface in an
appropriate covering space time. For example, the time slice  of the spacetime of Fig. 1 becomes a partial
Cauchy surface when this spacetime is “unrolled” to become Minkowski spacetime.
17 If V 	= ∅ then it is an open region.
18 Typically, if there is one such solution there will be many since the chronology violation region V will
lie beyond the domain of dependence of , as discussed below.
19 These include the Klein–Gordon field and the source-free Maxwell field.
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For example, Deutsch’s treatment uses the many worlds interpretation of quantum
mechanics plus the assignment of mixed rather than pure states to individual systems.
We will see below that quantum considerations provide the best hope for no-go result
for time machines.
Anticipating the discussion in the following section, our characterization of time
machines implies that there is a partial Cauchy surface on which the operating instruc-
tions for the machine are specified. Thus, insofar as the paradoxes of time travel are
concerned with consistency constraints, “no-go” results for time machines that depend
only on what happens before the formation of CTCs are independent of the paradoxes.
However, a purported “go” result would be tainted by the paradoxes—if they are indeed
paradoxes, rather than results that indicate a need to retrain our intuitions which are
tutored on cases without pathologies due to CTCs.
A diagnosis of one source of the lingering air of paradox can be gleaned from
the following quotation from a recent article in Physical Review D, a leading physics
journal:
Satisfactory physical theories must avoid giving rise to . . . self-contradictory
predictions. One approach to achieving this is to impose consistency constraints
on the allowable initial conditions on spacelike surfaces prior to the formation of
the CTCs, thus abandoning the principle that initial conditions on such surfaces
can be chosen at will. For example, in the case of the grandfather paradox we
might insist that the initial conditions just before the prospective murder include
the presence of a strategically placed banana peel on which the prospective mur-
derer slips as he pulls the trigger, thus spoiling his aim. One might refer to this
approach as the ‘banana peel mechanism’… (Everett 2004, p. 124023-1)
As the quotation indicates, the feeling of paradox arises from the conflict between the
notion that initial conditions ought to be freely specifiable and the idea that highly
contrived “banana peel mechanisms” have to be imposed to avoid a self-contradictory
result in the presence of CTCs.20
We advocate dispelling the air of paradox as follows. First, the notion that initial
conditions should be freely specifiable is simply wrong—as noted above, even in the
absence of global causal pathologies relativistic field equations may impose non-trivial
constraints C on initial data. As for the additional constraints that arise when CTCs
are present, no Cosmic Chaperone is needed to make sure that they are in place, for
these additional constraints are entailed by the conjunction of the local laws governing
the fields and the global structure of the spacetime on which the fields are propagat-
ing. This entailment arguably gives the additional constraints a lawlike status and, as
such, they arguably require no more explanation than do the constraints C. A caveat is
needed because there are distinctions between familiar constraints and the constraints
due to CTCs, emphasized by Arntzenius and Maudlin (2005): the constraints imposed
on data specified on a surface  due to the presence of CTCs depends on the global
structure of the spacetime and how  is embedded within it. Although we will not
20 This point has also been noted in the philosophical literature, and the need for “banana peel mechanisms”
has been used to argue for the improbability of time travel; see, e.g., Horwich (1987), and our response
below.
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argue the point here, our position is that these differences do not undermine our claim
that the “banana peel mechanisms” have the lawlike force of constraints. We endorse
the deflationary option that Everett offers when he concedes that the feeling that ini-
tial conditions are freely specifiable and that banana peel mechanisms are needed to
avoid paradoxes “may simply reflect our lack of experience with phenomena involving
CTCs” (ibid.).
This discussion reveals a second, closely related source of the air of paradox about
time travel; namely, since we typically assume a tame global spacetime structure, we
naturally explicate the notion of what is physically possible locally in time or space-
time as the compatibility of a local state of affairs with the local laws of physics. That
X is locally physically possible in this sense normally guarantees that X is physically
possible in-the-large, in that X can be realized as part of a global scenario compatible
with the same laws. But when the background spacetime contains a V 	= ∅ the guar-
antee can fail, since the local-to-global property described above may fail. When the
guarantee does fail one has the choice of modifying the explication of local physical
possibility to include a requirement of global realizability, or else of canceling the
expectation that being locally physically possible entails global realizability. Taking
spacetimes with CTCs seriously requires this “globalization” of physical possibility,
and the grandfather paradox and the like serve to highlight this surprising consequence.
It is (almost) universally agreed that nothing illuminating comes from trying to pro-
mote the clash between the special theory of relativity and intuitions about space and
time that have been tutored by Newtonian physics into “paradoxes of relativity,” save
when these “paradoxes” are used as a pedagogical device to highlight some of the dif-
ferences between the old and the new theory. Our analysis of the time travel paradoxes
is similar: they highlight the contrast between the analysis of physical possibility in a
spacetime with tame global structure and in a setting with CTCs.
Perhaps the paradoxes reveal something else entirely, namely that CTCs are implau-
sible or unlikely even if they are not logically or conceptually incoherent? This
response grants our argument above, but then infers the improbability of CTCs from
the “bizarre” nature of such constraints (see, e.g, Arntzenius and Maudlin 2005). The
image of Kurt repeatedly slipping on a banana peel as he tries to shoot Grandpa suggest
that the constraints would be strong enough to be immediately at odds with intuitive
judgments of local physical possibility. It is not yet known what form these constraints
will take for anything beyond simple toy models, and so it is unclear how much we
would be forced to revise our judgments regarding physical possibility. Although we
do not have space to pursue the issue fully here, we see two problems with arguments
based on the “bizarre” nature of the constraints. First, the constraints are relevantly
similar to other constraints that are a familiar and well-understood, if often over-
looked, feature of relativistic field equations. Pre-Maxwell physicists may have had
intuitions regarding the assignments of electric and magnetic fields that conflicted with
the constraint equations, but in what sense would noting their “bizarre-ness” relative
to pre-theoretical intuitions be a revealing criticism of Maxwell’s theory? Second, it is
unclear what is meant by the claim that CTCs are “improbable.” This could mean that
the “best fit” model of GTR that describes that universe or a subsystem of it probably
does not include CTCs. It is not clear how the existence of constraints would be relevant
to assessing this probability, or that the “bizarre nature” of constraints would trump
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other considerations. On the other hand, the claim could instead be read as a negative
assessment of the subjective probability or degree of belief for the theory—namely,
that any theory allowing CTCs and bizarre constraints on initial conditions should be
assigned a low probability. Something like this second sense of “improbability” may
motivate physicists pursuing no-go theorems. But even if that is the case there are
other more compelling reasons to assign a low probability to classical GTR, e.g., that
it is incompatible with quantum theory.
Our deflationary resolution of the paradoxes of time travel has relied on treating
a spacetime with a chronology violating region as a fixed background on which test
fields propagate. This treatment involves an idealization that may be legitimate for
some purposes, but strictly speaking it is inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of
GTR, which implies that the structure of spacetime is not fixed but co-evolves with
the matter-energy content according to the coupled Einstein-matter field equations.
It is, therefore, reasonable to request that the above discussion be redone with the
idealization removed. Our response is to forthrightly admit that we cannot fulfill the
request, and then to say so much the worse for the paradoxes of time travel! The point
is that without the idealization that treats a spacetime with a chronology violating
region as fixed background, it is difficult to make sense of the notion of the consis-
tency constraints that flow from the presence of CTCs. What one wants to know is
the answer to: What initial conditions for the coupled Einstein-matter field equations,
satisfying the constraints C appropriate for these coupled equations, can be realized in
a spacetime containing a chronology violating region V 	= ∅ and displaying features
______ ? Different ways of filling the blank can produce radically different answers.
The ambiguity is removed when one works with a fixed spacetime background; for
then the filling of the blank is automatically specified, and the answer to the question
at issue is entailed by the character of the solution set for the coupled Einstein-matter
field equations on the given background spacetime. But when the fixed background is
removed, there seems to be no principled way to fill the blank, and the choice of filling
is at the whim of pragmatic factors, such as the type of time travel story one happens
to be interested in at the moment. Thus, to the extent that the legitimate interest of the
so-called paradoxes of time travel is captured by the issue of consistency constraints,
that interest drains away as the notion of consistency constraints turns to mush, as it
seems to when the idealization of a fixed spacetime background is removed.
3 Operating a time machine
That time travel is physically possible—in the sense that there are physically possible
worlds (in either the weak or strong sense) with CTCs—does not necessarily mean
that it is physically possible to operate a time machine. Our goal in this section is to
get a grip on what the operation of a time machine would mean in terms of relativistic
spacetime structure, over and above the existence of CTCs.
Before starting on this task in earnest we should briefly explain our approach and
respond to a potential objection. Our aim is to clarify the sense in which operation of
a time machine can be said to “cause” or “produce” CTCs. The nature of the problem
disbars straightforward proposals, e.g. that the specification of initial data for physical
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fields within a TM region “produces” CTCs via dynamical evolution. This idea fails
because the CTCs necessarily fall outside the region of spacetime fixed via dynam-
ical evolution from the TM region, as we spell out below. In its place we propose a
Potency Condition, based on the intuition that although CTCs cannot lie within the
region causally determined by the TM region, they may be on the verge of forming—in
the sense that every possible extension of the TM region contains CTCs. Through-
out this discussion we characterize “causation” in terms of spacetime structure. But
perhaps this focus is too narrow, and there is some perfectly legitimate sense in which
a time machine “causes” the formation of CTCs that our analysis doesn’t capture? To
this objection our response is simply to encourage the objector to explain this broader
notion of “cause” that we have failed to capture, and warn her of the challenge she
faces. We suspect that analyses of causation developed to handle ordinary cases of
causation will not be of much use in considering time machines. Absent some broader
notion of causation applicable to this case, we proceed to use the technical tools that
do shed light on the nature of time machines.
Another aspect of our approach deserves comment: in this section we give a def-
inition of a TM, delaying the assessment of physical possibility until later sections.
The concepts of causal structure employed in the definition are both more general
and more fundamental than a particular choice of field equations. They are a common
ingredient of all the hybrids of quantum theory and GTR discussed below, so our def-
inition can be employed across this range of cases. Admittedly, quantum gravity may
someday reveal these ideas are only approximations to some quite different underlying
structure, but that day is not yet here—so we continue to rely on them. Once we have
a grasp on the spacetime geometry of a TM, we consider whether such a geometrical
configuration falls within the space of physical possibilities delimited by a given set
of field equations.
Returning to our task, if the spacetime M, gab is to accommodate a time machine
then it should be possible to choose a global slice , corresponding to a time before
the time machine goes into operation, such that no CTCs exist up to “time” ; for
otherwise there would be no need for a time machine. (Thus, Gödel spacetime, so
beloved by philosophers who write on time travel, is ruled out in the first instance as
a time machine spacetime since it lacks a global slice.) Without much loss of gener-
ality, it can be assumed that  is a partial Cauchy surface.21 Then the conditions that
encode the instructions for the operation of the time machine can be set on . To assure
that the instructions are obeyed, the region of spacetime T M ⊂ M corresponding to
the operation of the time machine should belong to the future domain of dependence
D+() of . (D+() consists of all points p ∈ M such that every past intextendible
causal curve through p intersects . The past domain of dependence D−() is defined
analogously.  ⊂ M is dubbed a Cauchy surface if its total domain of dependence
D() := D+()∪ D−() is M. A spacetime that admits a Cauchy surface is said to
be globally hyperbolic.22) And whatever the details of its operation, a time machine is
21 Recall that if  is a global time slice for M, gab , then  can be turned into a partial Cauchy surface by
passing (if necessary) to a covering spacetime of M, gab .
22 For the official definition of global hyperbolicity and a proof that a spacetime is globally hyperbolic iff
it admits a Cauchy surface, see Hawking and Ellis (1973, pp. 206–212). For the hyperbolic field equations
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Fig. 2 A spacetime containing a would-be time machine
supposed to be confined to a finite region of space and to operate for a finite amount of
time, implying that T M should have compact closure.23 And finally, to help capture
the idea that CTCs result from the operation of the time machine, it should be the case
that the chronology violating region V is contained in the causal future J+(T M) of
T M. (J+(S), S ⊂ M, is defined as the set of all p ∈ M such that p can be reached
from S via a future directed causal curve. The causal past J−(S) of a set S is defined
analogously.)24 These requirements are summarized schematically in Fig. 2.
This is very sketchy, but even without filling in the details two difficulties should
be apparent. The first is that no matter how this scenario is filled in, it will not yield
the kind of time travel beloved by science fiction writers, for traveling from the “time”
 into the causal past J−() of  is ruled out by the set-up. The kind of time travel
promoted by a time machine is thus confined to the future of the “time” . We see no
way around this limitation as long as time machines are to be implemented in orthodox
relativistic spacetimes.
A second and much more serious difficulty lies in making sense of the notion that
CTCs are the “result of” the operation of the time machine. This notion cannot be
understood in the sense of causal determinism since V , if it is non-null, always lies
outside D+(T M) and, indeed, outside of D+(). Nor does it help to point to the stip-
ulation that V ⊂ J+(T M), for while that condition guarantees that every point in the
chronology violating region region can be causally influenced by the operation of the
time machine, it does not rule out the possibility that V is affected, perhaps decisively,
by influences not emanating from T M. Requiring that J−(V) ∩  has compact clo-
sure guarantees that any influences on the time travel region emanating from  must
originate from a finite portion thereof, which is certainly desirable since conditions on
Footnote 22 continued
encountered in relativistic theories, there are typically existence and uniqueness theorems that say in effect
that appropriate initial conditions on a partial Cauchy surface  uniquely determine a solution throughout
the globally hyperbolic region D().
23 This rules out seeing Gott’s (1991) model as a time machine since it uses two infinitely long cosmic
strings.
24 Thus, it is somewhat misleading to characterize no-go results as making “the universe safe for historians”
(Hawking 1992a, p. 603) since the very set-up of the problem automatically gives this safety.
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Fig. 3 Influences coming from a singularity or from infinity
 specify the operation of the time machine and such a device is supposed to be finite.
But again the trouble is that the condition in question does not ensure that there aren’t
other influences, perhaps decisive, on V which originate from outside J−(V) ∩  or
even from outside of all of . The worry is illustrated by the simple but contrived
example of Fig. 3. The missing point p represents a singularity from which causal
influences, not determined by the conditions on , can emerge and propagate to effect
V , even though J−(V) ∩  has compact closure. This trivial singularity can be made
irremovable, without changing the causal structure pictured in Fig. 3, by replacing the
original metric gab by φ2gab where φ is a scalar field that goes to zero as the missing
point is approached. Alternatively, if φ is chosen to “blow up” as the missing point is
approached, the singularity can be made to disappear by pushing it off to infinity. But
in that case V is subject to influences coming from “infinity.”
Hawking (1992a) presumably had in mind these sorts of difficulties when he
imposed the requirement that the future Cauchy horizon H+() of  be compactly
generated (see also Hawking 1992b). H+() is the future boundary of D+() (i.e.
D+() − I−(D+()), where the overbar denotes topological closure and I−(S),
S ⊂ M, is the chronological past of S consisting of all points p such that there is a
past directed timelike curve from S to p). H+(), which bounds the part of spacetime
whose state can be causally determined by conditions on , is necessarily a null sur-
face, and its generators are null geodesics. If these generators, when traced far enough
into the past, fall into and remain in a compact set, then the Cauchy horizon is said to
be compactly generated. This requirement precludes the possibility of the generators
emerging from a curvature singularity or coming from infinity and, thus, rules out the
example of Fig. 3, whether or not it is doctored by the addition of a conformal factor;
for no neighborhood of the missing point p has compact closure, and thus every past
directed generator of H+() will not remain trapped within a compact set.
It is not clear at the outset whether Hawking’s condition is either necessary or
sufficient for the operation of a time machine. As for necessity, it is true that a viola-
tion of Hawking’s condition opens the possibility that the chronology violating region
is affected by influences coming not from the would-be time machine but from a
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singularity or from infinity; but it does not follow that this is in fact the case.25 And
as for sufficiency, it is not at all obvious how, even in conjunction with the other
restrictions imposed above, the requirement that the chronology violating region is
not affected by influences coming from infinity or singularities ensures that the devel-
opment of CTCs is “due to” the operation of the would-be time machine.
One obvious and seemingly attractive way to obtain such an assurance is to require
that every suitable extension of D+() contains CTCs—call this the Potency Condi-
tion for the would-be time machine.26 Satisfaction of the Potency Condition would
not guarantee that the details of the particular way in which CTCs in fact developed
are due to the operation of the would-be time machine; but we know already that no
condition can provide such a guarantee, at least not via causal determinism. Satisfac-
tion of the Potency Condition would provide the next-best-thing by guaranteeing the
development of CTCs in some form or other. Of course, the condition as stated remains
a schema rather than a definite condition until “suitable extension” is defined. At a
minimum the extension should be smooth and maximal (i.e. does not admit a proper
extension). At the very least, any dynamical theory will add as a condition the satis-
faction of its dynamical equations. For reasons given above, we do not impose any of
these conditions just yet although we recognize that ultimately, dynamical conditions
must be included in an assessment of physical possibility. We will get to the fate of
time machines in various dynamical theories in Sects. 4–7. Here, we attempt to lay
bare the most fundamental causal spacetime structure that they all share. In general,
the more additional restrictions that are put on the allowed extensions, the weaker the
potency.
There is little hope, however, that the strongest form of the Potency Condition is
ever realized. To see the reason for the pessimism, consider the case of Misner space-
time (see Fig. 4a), a two-dimensional spacetime which captures some of the causal
features of Taub-NUT spacetime, itself a homogeneous vacuum solution to Einstein’s
field equations. Misner spacetime is topologically S1x R. In the lower, or Taub region,
the surfaces of homogeneity, such as , are spacelike. But because the light cones “tip
over,” the surfaces of homogeneity eventually become more and more lightlike, until
eventually one reaches H+(), which is not only compactly generated but compact.
If the Potency Condition is going to be satisfied in a strong form, Misner spacetime
would seem to be an ideal candidate; for H+() contains a closed null curve (CNC),
indicating that CTCs are on the verge of forming. But not every smooth maximal
extension of the D+() contains CTCs; nor does every such extension have a com-
pact or compactly generated H+() containing CNCs. A smooth maximal extension
sans CTCs and sans compactly generated H+() can be constructed by cutting out
vertical strips as shown in Fig. 4b and slapping on appropriate conformal factors that
preserve the causal structure and ensure maximality by “blowing up” as the cut-out
regions are approached. Requiring that “suitable extensions” satisfy Einstein’s field
25 As was pointed out to us by Amos Ori.
26 Or even more stringently that every suitable extension of D+(o), for some compact o ⊂ , contains
CTCs.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4 (a) Misner spacetime, (b) Misner spacetime with strips removed
equations and standard energy conditions27 would presumably disbar such construc-
tions but would also, of course, weaken the potency.28
However, even if the surgery-and-conformal-factor trick is disbarred, a CTC-free
maximal extension of the Taub region can still be constructed by the alternative method
of blocking CTC formation by first cutting out vertical strips (as in Fig. 4b) and then
ensuring maximality by taking the universal covering spacetime of the surgically muti-
lated spacetime.29,30 To disbar such artifices in a non-question begging fashion and
to give the Potency Condition a fighting chance of being instantiated, we will impose
Geroch’s (1977) condition of hole freeness. A spacetime M, gab is said to be hole free
just in case for any spacelike  ⊂ M (not necessarily a global time slice) there is no
isometric imbedding ι : D() → M′ into a spacetime M′, g′ab such that ι(D()) is
a proper subset of D(ι()).31 That it is not question begging to require hole freeness
in the present context follows from two considerations. First, we are seeking, so to
27 These conditions, which will be discussed in the following section, rule out negative energy densities
and the like.
28 Recall that our goal here is to offer a definition of a TM in terms of spacetime geometry without assessing
physical possiblity. Within the context of a particular theory, such as classical GTR, it is natural to require
that the extensions satisfy Einstein’s field equations and various energy conditions, and then attempt to
prove no-go theorems; see Sect. 4.
29 We are indebted to Robert Geroch for this example, as well as for the suggestion to use the condition of
hole freeness (see below), which was first introduced in Geroch (1977).
30 Ori (2005) has described a time machine model for which he claims that every regular extension beyond
the Cauchy horizon includes a chronology violating region. The claim seems plausible—if the sorts of
tricks we are discussing are disbarred. Ori (2007) appeals to a condition similar to our Potency Condi-
tion in order to capture the notion that the formation of CTCs is “triggered by” the initial conditions on
(see 044022-3). Our Potency Condition was originally proposed in the pre-print “Take a Ride on a Time
Machine” posted to the PhilSciArchive in 2003 and in revised form on 19 March 2004 (see philsciar-
chive.pitt.edu/archive/00001673). Since then this condition has appeared in various guises in the physics
literature on time machines.
31 In defining the domain of dependence D() of  it is typically assumed (if only implicitly) that  is
achronal. Since we are applying the notion of hole freeness to possibly acausal spacetimes, we cannot make
this assumption. Thus, D() is to be understood to consist of all points p such that every inextendible causal
curve through p meets  at least once (and possibly many times). As far as we can tell, this understanding
leads to no counterintuitive consequences. But if this is incorrect, the definition of hole freeness can be
modified as follows: M, gab is counted as hole free just in case for any open U ⊂ M and any achronal
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speak, the next best thing to the notion that the operation of the would-be time machine
causally determines that CTCs emerge. And, second, causal determinism itself has no
prayer of being satisfied unless hole freeness is required (see Earman 1995, Sec. 3.8).
With this understanding, our proposed version of the strongest form of the Potency
Condition requires that every extension of D+() contains CTCs if it is smooth and
hole free. Manchak (2007) has very recently proven that Misner spacetime satisfies a
slightly modified version of the strongest Potency Condition in which it is required
that the closure of D+() be hole free.32 If the class of spacetimes satisfying this form
of the condition should prove to be empty with the exception of Misner spacetime, the
potency can be weakened by requiring in addition that extensions satisfy Einstein’s
field equations and energy conditions, or field equations derived from a proposed
theory of quantum gravity. Thus, a hierarchy of Potency Conditions of decreasing
strength emerges, indexed according to the theory used to delimit the physically pos-
sible extensions, with a correspondingly growing class of spacetimes satisfying the
conditions.
To see the bite of the Potency Condition, consider a proposal of Krasnikov (1998)
for defining relativistic time machines.
Definition Let M, gab be an inextendible spacetime with a non-null chronology vio-
lating region V . K ⊂ M is said to be a Krasnikov time machine iff (i) V ⊂ K and
(ii) M − J+(K) is isometric to a region M′ − J+(K′) of a spacetime M′, g′ab that
does not contain CTCs and K′ ⊂ M′ is compact.
Footnote 31 continued
spacelike  of the spacetime U , gab|U there is no isometric imbedding ι : D() → U ′ into a spacetime
U ′, g′
ab such that ι() is achronal and ι(D()) is a proper subset of D(ι()).
32 In fact, he prefers a slightly modified definition of “future domain of dependence” according to which
D+() consists of all points in M from which every past-directed, inextendible timelike curve intersects
. In this case, he shows, Misner spacetime satisfies the Potency Condition even without imposing hole
freeness. The extensions must only be maximal and smooth. The standard definition of D+() which we
use here, can be found in Hawking and Ellis (1973, p. 201) and Wald (1984, p. 200). Geroch (1970) originally
introduced the notion using “timelike curve” instead of “causal curve” as is now standard. The resulting
future domains of dependence differ insofar as the standard domain is a proper subset of the non-standard
domain à la Geroch: the latter, but not the former includes the boundary points of D+(). Manchak shows
that the adoption of Geroch’s original definition can be exploited to show that surgery on Misner spacetime
as performed in Fig. 4b cannot preclude the emergence of CTCs in all maximal extensions of D+(). The
removed strips in Fig. 4b cut all the way into H+(). This is no longer permissible under Geroch’s defini-
tion because it includes the Cauchy horizon H+() in D+(). Manchak shows that smoothly extending
this non-standard future domain of dependence of Misner spacetime will always allow just enough of a
window for CTCs to slip through below the cut. We reject this alternative conception of D+() because it
would allow causal signals that have not emanated from the time slice under consideration to reach points
in the future domain of dependence. But this would frustrate our attempts at offering the strongest possible
sense in which the CTCs are due to the operation of the potential time machine. As a consequence of our
rejection of the alternative conception of D+(), hole freeness must be used to obtain the result that Misner
spacetime satisfies the Potency Condition, which is not necessary on the alternative conception as shown
by Manchak. For the proof to go through, one does not need to require hole freeness of the entire maximal
extension of D+(), but only of the closure of D+(). We maintain that the stronger demand of hole
freeness for the entire maximal extension is still preferable since we want to rule out in general artifical
cutting strategies attempting to foil the formation of CTCs, as exemplified in Fig. 4b. If CTCs fail to occur,
it should be for a better reason than God using his scissors to cut the CTCs.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 5 (a) Deutsch-Politzer spacetime, (b) Minkowski spacetime
Krasnikov (1998) constructs a spacetime which contains a time machine in this sense,
which is singularity free, and which satisfies the weak energy condition (the sig-
nificance of this condition is discussed in the following section). The construction
proceeds in two steps. First, construct a Deutsch-Politzer spacetime (see Fig. 5a) by
deleting the points p1 − p4 from Minkowski spacetime and then gluing together the
strips as shown. Because of the missing points the spacetime is singular in the sense of
geodesic incompleteness.33 This is taken care of in the second step. The introduction
of an appropriate conformal factor leaves the causal structure the same but makes the
spacetime geodesically complete (and, indeed, b-complete34) without violating the
weak energy condition.
The Definition is satisfied if K is chosen to be the causal future of the shaded
rectangle shown in Fig. 5a and K′ is chosen to be the shaded region of Minkowski
spacetime shown in Fig. 5b. But this reveals the defect of the definition: there is no
separation between the operation of the supposed time machine and the CTCs it is sup-
posed to produce. To overcome this defect one could modify the Definition to require
that V ⊂ J+(K) and that K, like K′, has compact closure. The modified definition
is satisfied if K is chosen to be the shaded rectangle in Fig. 5a rather than its causal
future. But now another glaring defect emerges: there is no reasonable sense in which
this new K corresponds to the operation of a time machine. Up to “time” ′, which
is after the alleged time machine has operated, the Deutsch-Politzer spacetime and
33 A spacetime is geodesically complete just in case every geodesic can be extended to arbitrarily large
values of one of its affine parameters.
34 b-completeness is stronger than geodesic completeness. For a definition of b-completeness see Hawking
and Ellis (1973, p. 259).
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the corresponding portion of Minkowski spacetime (Fig. 5b) are isometric. So there
is no reasonable sense in which the CTCs in Deutsch-Politzer spacetime are “due to”
the conditions in the time machine region K—or for that matter to the entirety of the
conditions prior to ′, which may be chosen to lie as close to the chronology violating
region V as desired. For no interesting form of the Potency Condition is fulfilled in this
case since there are extensions beyond ′—e.g. to Minkowski spacetime—which do
not contain CTCs but which satisfy every condition that could be reasonably demanded
of a suitable extension.
If the Potency Condition is accepted as the key to seeing a time machine at work,
then one could seek to motivate Hawking’s condition of compactly generated future
Cauchy horizon by proving a form of the conjecture that, in some broad and interest-
ing class of spacetimes, when H+() is compactly generated, the Potency Condition
is realized for D+(). The seeming plausibility of such a conjecture follows from
the fact that strong causality is violated in a neighborhood of H+() if it is com-
pactly generated.35 (Strong causality is violated at a point p if, intuitively, there are
almost closed causal curves near p; more precisely, there is a neighborhood of p
such that every subneighborhood has the property that some causal curve intersects it
more than once.) This violation can be taken as an indication that the seeds of acau-
sality have been planted in D+() and are ready to bloom in the form of CTCs in
any non-artificially constructed maximal extension. But to the extent that the Potency
Condition can be satisfied in the absence of a compactly generated Cauchy horizon,
Hawking’s condition cannot be counted as a necessary condition for the operation of
a time machine.
At first blush the suggested approach to identifying the operation of a time machine
by means of the Potency Condition is threatened by a result of Krasnikov (2002)
showing that every time oriented spacetime M, gab without CTCs has as an extension
a maximal time oriented spacetime such that any CTC in the extension lies to the
chronological past of the image of M in the extension. Furthermore, the construction
allows local conditions on the metric, such as Einstein’s field equations and energy
conditions, to be carried over to the maximal extension. But at second glance, it is
not at all obvious that Krasnikov’s construction guarantees that his maximal extension
will satisfy our preferred form of the Potency Condition that includes a hole freeness
restriction on extensions. And the result of Manchak (2007) mentioned above indicates
that the Potency Condition in our preferred form is not empty.
In the next section we start to include among the requirements asked of suitable
extensions H+() various constraints based on dynamics. But before turning to this
task we want to acknowledge an alternative approach. Our method of specifying
what it means for a would-be time machine to be “responsible for” the formation
of CTCs appeals to features of the causal structure of the spacetimes of classical GTR.
Alternatively, one could try to cash out “responsible for” using one or another of the
analyses of causation available in the philosophical literature. The three leading anal-
yses are (i) interventionist, (ii) counterfactual, and (iii) probabilistic. The first seems
35 This follows from the result that the generators of H+() for a partial Cauchy surface  are past
endless. If H+() is compactly generated, we thus have a past endless causal curve totally imprisoned in
a compact set, and thus by Prop. 6.4.7 of Hawking and Ellis (1973, p. 195) strong causality fails in this set.
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inappropriate when the system at issue is the entire cosmos. The second and third
require an apparatus that is not provided by GTR itself—in the case of (ii) a nearness
relation on the possible worlds (here, solutions to Einstein’s field equations) and in
the case of (iii) a probability measure over these worlds. Providing such an apparatus
and discussing its implications for time machines is a worthy enterprise. But it is not
one that we will pursue here since it quickly loses contact with the physics literature
and threatens to mire the discussion of time machines in the endless controversies that
swirl around the cause–effect relation.
4 Chronology protection and no-go results for time machines in classical GTR
The absence of a satisfactory analysis of “time machine” in the sizable and ever
growing physics literature on this topic is less scandalous than it might seem at first
impression, at least for that portion of the literature that aims at no-go results; for the
authors of these results don’t have to offer an analysis but only necessary conditions
for the operation of a time machine. Our complaint about this literature does not derive
from the lack of a general analysis but from the fact that a scrutiny of the proffered
necessary conditions often reveals a dubious quality that undermines the force of the
no-go result.
The program of producing no-go results for time machines can be seen as part of
the more ambitious program of producing chronology protection theorems that take
the form: “If no CTCs are present to begin with, then CTCs cannot emerge without
violating conditions _____,” where the conditions that go into the blank are to be jus-
tified on the grounds that they must be satisfied in any physically reasonable model of
GTR. (Hawking’s original version of the chronology protection conjecture stated that:
“The laws of physics do not allow the appearance of closed timelike curves” (1992a,
p. 603).) Establishing that CTCs cannot be manufactured by time machines would
go part way—but only part way—towards establishing chronology protection. In the
other direction, a strong chronology protection theorem would put the time machine
industry out of business without having to settle on necessary and sufficient conditions
for a time machine. In turn, the program of establishing chronology protection can
be seen as part of the still more ambitious program of establishing a strong version
of cosmic censorship, which militates against the formation of “naked singularities”
in the form of any pathology that would undermine global hyperbolicity (see Penrose
(1998)).
In preparation for the discussion of chronology protection results, we will comment
briefly on the role of energy conditions. Einstein’s field equations set the Einstein ten-
sor Gab, which is computed from the metric gab and its derivatives, proportional to
the stress-energy tensor Tab, which describes the distribution of matter-energy. Save
for the vacuum case (Tab ≡ 0) the imposition of Einstein’s field equations has no
bite unless restrictions are put on possible values for Tab; for given any smooth met-
ric gab, Einstein’s equations are satisfied for the Tab simply set equal to Gab/8π (in
geometrical units, where G = c = 1). The field equations do have considerable bite
when conjoined with the requirement that Tab must arise from known matter fields.
But adopting this requirement would mean that chronology protection theorems could
not have the ambition of showing that chronology is protected for as yet unknown but
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physically reasonable fields. For this reason chronology protection theorems adopt
instead one or another condition on Tab thought to hold for most, if not all, physically
reasonable fields.
The most widely cited of these conditions is called the weak energy condition
(WEC), which says intuitively that there are no negative energy densities. The tech-
nical statement is that TabV a V b ≥ 0 for any timelike V a . For a perfect fluid with
density µ and pressure p this is equivalent to requiring µ ≥ 0 and µ + p ≥ 0.
The strong energy condition (SEC) which, despite what its name suggests, does not
entail the WEC, requires that TabV a V b ≥ 12 Tr(Tab) for every unit timelike V
a
. The
dominant energy condition (DEC) says intuitively that the energy–momentum flow as
measured by any observer is non-spacelike. Technically the condition is that for any
future-directed timelike V a , −TabV a is a future-directed null or timelike vector.36
Satisfaction of these energy conditions is sometimes taken as the defining fea-
ture of physically reasonable matter. But these conditions are not sacrosanct; they
can fail to hold for quantum fields, and recently physicists have contemplated matter
sources violating one or more of the energy conditions. To take a recent example,
in standard Friedmann–Robertson–Walker cosmological models the expansion of the
universe decelerates if the matter sources satisfy the WEC and the SEC.37 To capture
the observed accelerated expansion in these models, there must be a form of matter,
“dark energy,” violating the SEC.38 One candidate for the dark energy called “phantom
matter” violates all three of the above energy conditions. It has been suggested that
such matter could be used to produce traversable wormholes and thence CTCs (see
Lobo (2005)); but because the violation of the DEC by such matter opens to door to
acausal propagation, it is not clear how seriously the suggestion should be taken.
Early no-go results for time machines were proved by Tipler (1976, 1977). His
results showed that the evolution of CTCs from regular initial data on an asymptoti-
cally flat partial Cauchy surface would, under certain conditions, lead to a violation of
the conjunction of the Einstein field equations and the WEC, or else would cause space-
time singularities to form. Thus, if to “manufacture” CTCs means “construct using
only ordinary matter everywhere” and “ordinary matter” satisfies the WEC and does
not reach arbitrarily great densities, then the theorems do count as no-go results for
time machines. Or at least they would if the sense of “singularity” used in the proof of
the theorems—namely, geodesic completeness—entailed the existence of arbitrarily
large matter densities; but this entailment is not universal. In particular it fails to hold
for typical time machine models, in which the presence of an incomplete null geodesic
does not signal divergent matter densities.39 A second and more important limitation
(noted by Ori 1993) is that Tipler’s theorems do not contain any information about
36 The minus sign is a result of our choice of signature (+ + +−) for the spacetime metric.
37 More precisely, a¨ < 0 if the WEC and SEC are satisfied, where a(t) is the scale factor in the FRW
models.
38 For a review of the dark energy problem, see S. Carroll (2004).
39 For example, Hawking (1992a) discusses a time machine model including a “fountain” of the compactly
generated Cauchy horizon, an incomplete null geodesic, which is not associated with divergent energy
densities.
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when the singularities form; if they do not form prior to the emergence of CTCs, then
even if they do entail unbounded matter densities they cannot serve as an explanation
of why CTCs cannot be manufactured from ordinary matter.
The next significant chronology protection result was due to Stephen Hawking.
If  is a partial Cauchy surface and H+() is compact, then  must be compact
(Hawking 1992a; Chrusciel and Isenberg 1993). This is a purely geometrical result.40
Thus, whether or not Einstein’s field equations or energy conditions hold, if  is
non-compact (i.e. the universe is spatially open), then H+() is non-compact. But
can H+() nevertheless be compactly generated when  is non-compact? Hawking
(1992a) showed that the answer is no under plausible assumptions. Specifically, he
proved that if  is non-compact and if Einstein’s field equations and the WEC are
satisfied, then H+() cannot be compactly generated.
How effective is Hawking’s result in protecting chronology? The first comment
is that the WEC is not absolutely sacred even in classical GTR. Vollick (1997) has
shown how the WEC can be violated using a charged dust interacting with a scalar
field. Although the dust and the scalar field separately have positive energy densities,
the interaction part of the stress-energy tensor can have negative energy densities.
Using this fact, Vollick showed that it is possible to build a sphere of charged dust
with negative energy density throughout the interior.41
But apart from doubts about the WEC, the crucial issue is whether the condition of
compactly generated Cauchy horizons can be justified as a necessary condition for the
operation of a time machine since it certainly cannot be justified as a condition that any
physically reasonable model of GTR must fulfill. By our lights the justification would
have to proceed by showing that when H+() is not compactly generated, a strong
and interesting form of the Potency Condition necessarily fails. This seems implau-
sible, for there is no evident reason why, in the generic case of a four-dimensional
inhomogeneous spacetime, it cannot happen that the behavior of the metric in one
region of D+() implies that all smooth hole free extensions that satisfy Einstein’s
field equations and energy conditions contain CTCs, while overall the behavior of the
metric implies that H+() is not compactly generated in some or all such extensions
(because, for example, curvature singularities develop in other regions).42 Of course,
this objection falls flat if our preferred version of the Potency Condition cannot be
satisfied for the class of models being considered. But in that case the issue of whether
Hawking’s condition of compactly generated Cauchy horizons is necessary for the
40 Assuming that the spacetime is time orientable, there always exists a continuous non-vanishing timelike
vector field. Using the integral curves of this vector field, map the points of H+() into the interior D+().
This mapping is one-to-one and onto. Thus, if H+() is compact, so is the resulting surface. In addition,
the resulting surface is spacelike and diffeomorphic to .
41 Vollick shows that for a sphere of charged particles coupled to a scalar field, T44 < 0 in the interior of





µo R2 > 2, where α is the coupling constant between matter and the scalar
field, µo is the rest mass density, and R is the radius of the sphere. Although this violation of the weak
energy condition is achieved without recourse to zero-point energies and other subtleties of quantum field
theory, the scalar field must be very strongly coupled to matter over large distances. We take the existence
of such a scalar field to be physically implausible.
42 Doubts about Hawking’s condition of compactly generated Cauchy horizon as a sine qua non for time
machines have also been expressed by Ori (1993) and Krasnikov (1999).
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operation of a time machine is moot since it is unclear how to characterize a time
machine for the class of models under consideration.
Hawking’s theorem does not apply when the partial Cauchy surface  is compact,
for otherwise Taub-NUT spacetime and Misner spacetime would be counterexam-
ples. To attempt to fill the gap, one can bring to bear Theorem 3 of Tipler (1977). The
proof of this theorem can be adapted to show that if the WEC and Einstein’s field
equations hold and if the generic condition holds somewhere on H+()( 	= ∅), then
H+() is not compactly generated. Taub-NUT spacetime and Misner spacetime are
not counterexamples because they violate the generic condition which requires that
V a V bV[c Rd]ab[eV f ] = 0, where Rabcd is the Riemann tensor and V a is the tangent to
a timelike or null geodesic. The generic condition entails that all geodesics feel a tidal
force. The absence of such a force on all of H+() would signal that the spacetime
is of a rather “special” character.43 But then no one thought that spacetimes imple-
menting time machines would be generic. One expects more from a no-go result than
a statement of the form: a time machine can operate only under such-and-such special
conditions.
Hawking (1992a) attempted to fill the gap in another way. When  is compact,
H+() can be compactly generated. But if it is, both the convergence and shear of
the null geodesic generators of H+() must vanish if the WEC holds. “This would
mean,” Hawking wrote, “that no matter or information, and in particular no observers,
could cross the Cauchy horizon into the region of closed timelike curves” (p. 606).
But this implication doesn’t constitute an anti-time machine result per se; it says rather
that the operator of the time machine cannot take advantage of his handiwork.
Two further results deserve brief mention. Maeda et al. (1998) prove that there is no
maximal spacetime containing a non-empty chronology violating set V if a number of
conditions are satisfied. The theorem is self-consciously styled as a no-go result for
time machines, but as such it is aimed mainly at finitely vicious spacetimes (where V
is contained in a compact set) that arise from the sorts of identifications made in the
construction of Deutsch-Politzer spacetime. We argued in the preceding section that
Deutsch-Politzer spacetime is not a plausible candidate for a time machine spacetime,
so this theorem does not recommend itself as a general chronology protection theo-
rem. Another recent no-go result operates against the possibility of producing CTCs
by means of traversable wormholes: Hochberg and Visser (1997, 1999) establish the
violation of energy conditions at or near the throats of traversable wormholes.
In sum, while the various theorems reviewed above that have been advertised as
no-go results for time machines or as chronology protection theorems for classical
GTR do indicate that there are problematic aspects to implementing a time machine
in this context, they do not justify the gloss that the laws of classical GTR forbid the
operation of a time machine.
43 There are other results which further suggest that a time machine spacetime must be “special.” For exam-
ple, Isenberg and Moncrief (1985) considered analytic vacuum and electrovacuum solutions to EFE which
contain a compact null hypersurface ruled by closed null geodesics. They showed that such spacetimes
must be special in the sense that they possess a Killing symmetry.
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5 No-go results using semi-classical quantum gravity
The introduction of quantum considerations cuts in two directions with respect to
proving chronology protection results and/or no-go results for time machines: in one
direction the quantum would appear to undermine the classical no-go results since
quantum fields can, for example, violate the WEC assumed in many of these results;44
but in the other direction the quantum introduces new mechanisms that may prevent
the formation of CTCs. In this section we study one such mechanism which arises in
the context of semi-classical quantum gravity (SCQG).
The ambitions of SCQG do not extend to quantizing the metric; rather the aim is to
estimate how quantum fields affect the metric by computing the quantum expectation
value 〈ξ |Tab|ξ 〉 of the (renormalized) stress-energy tensor Tab that arises from the
quantum fields, and then by inserting this expression into Einstein’s field equations in
place of the classical stress-energy tensor in order to calculate the “backreaction” of
the fields on the metric. Work by Frolov (1991) and Kim and Thorne (1991) suggested
that for physically interesting states |ξ 〉 of linear quantum fields, 〈ξ |Tab|ξ 〉 diverges
as the Cauchy horizon H+() is approached in classical general relativistic space-
times where CTCs occur to the future of H+(). Hawking (1992a) argued that when
the backreaction has an attractive gravitational effect, the divergence behavior would
cause the formation of singularities along H+(), cutting off future development of
the spacetime, whereas when the backreaction has a repulsive gravitational effect “the
spacetime will resist being warped so that closed timelike curves appear” (p. 610);
either way, the mechanism of SCQG acts to prevent the formation of CTCs. Hawk-
ing’s argument has not been made rigorous; indeed, it cannot be made rigorous in our
present state of knowledge since, presumably, the details will depend on the presently
non-existent quantum theory of gravity.
Basing a no-go theorem on the divergence of 〈ξ |Tab|ξ 〉 faces a more immediate
obstacle: in some cases there is no divergence! Krasnikov (1996) and Sushkov (1997)
studied some toy models with CTCs and a partial Cauchy surface and exhibited states
|ξ 〉 for which 〈ξ |Tab|ξ 〉 remains bounded as H+() is approached.45 The “Sushkov
state” is not entirely well behaved since the expectation values of other field quantities
diverge as the Cauchy horizon is approached. If anything, these results show that one
can circumvent the heuristic arguments for the divergence of 〈ξ |Tab|ξ 〉 by cleverly
choosing the field and/or the spacetime.46 A general problem with these results is that
44 However, Ford and Roman (1996) argue that “quantum inequalities” place limitations on the violation of
the weak energy condition and that in turn these limitations constrain the geometry of traversable wormholes
that might allow CTCs. For a review of more recent results along these lines see Fewster (2005).
45 Sushkov (1997) proved that for an automorphic quantum field (characterized as a complex scalar field
ϕ in an external electromagnetic field) in four-dimensional Misner space, carefully setting the automorphic
parameter yields a field such that 〈ξ |Tab|ξ〉 is zero everywhere on the initially globally hyperbolic region
D+(). An automorphic field at a point x satisfies the following condition: ϕ(Lx) = exp(2π iα)ϕ(x),
where L is an element of the spacetime isometry group and 0 ≤ α ≤ 12 is the automorphic parameter.
46 Hiscock (2000) has rejected these and other purported counterexamples to Hawking’s chronology pro-
tection conjecture on the grounds that they either rely on special properties of the quantum fields or else
they depend on “fine tuning” the metric parameters. In a similar vein, purported counterexamples to Roger
Penrose’s cosmic censorship hypothesis have been rejected on the grounds that they are highly non-generic.
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even if there is a well-defined limit of 〈ξ |Tab|ξ 〉 as the horizon is approached, the value
of 〈ξ |Tab|ξ 〉 on the horizon may still be singular. In the Sushkov state the renormalized
stress energy tensor vanishes on the initially globally hyperbolic region, but it vanishes
on the Cauchy horizon as well only if continuity holds (see Cramer and Kay 1996).
A result due to Kay et al. (1997) (hereafter, KRW) shows that continuity necessarily
fails: 〈ξ |Tab|ξ 〉 cannot be non-singular on all of H+() when H+() is compactly
generated.47 In any case, physicists gave up on the idea that the “blow up” of 〈ξ |Tab|ξ 〉
at the chronology horizon provides a mechanism for chronology protection.
Rather than focusing on the behavior of field properties as H+() is approached,
KRW prove that the formation of CTCs undermines the applicability of SCQG. Under-
standing their result requires a brief review of the “point-splitting prescription” for
evaluating 〈ξ |Tab|ξ 〉 (see Wald 1994, Ch. 4 and KRW). The stress energy tensor for a
scalar field ϕ typically includes ϕ2 terms.48 There is no natural way to define a product
of distributions at a single point. As the name suggests, in point-splitting the product
is treated as the coincidence limit of a bidistribution defined over two points, e.g.
〈ξ |ϕ2(x)|ξ 〉 := limx→x ′ [〈ξ |ϕ(x)ϕ(x ′)|ξ 〉− H(x, x ′)]. H(x, x ′) corresponds to “vac-
uum stress-energy” and it is subtracted to get rid of possible divergences. The quantity
in square brackets is a smooth, well-defined function of x and x ′ only if the two terms
have the same short range singularity behavior. In Minkowski spacetime H(x, x ′) for
the preferred vacuum state is singular if and only if the points (x, x ′) are null related. So
the procedure yields a well-defined quantity 〈ξ |ϕ2(x)|ξ 〉 if 〈ξ |ϕ(x)ϕ(x ′)|ξ 〉 is required
to have the same singular behavior as H(x, x ′).
Generalizing this approach to curved spacetimes leads to the requirement that phys-
ically admissible states satisfy what is called the Hadamard condition. Curved space-
times lack a preferred global vacuum state, so to apply the point-splitting prescription
one needs to determine the properties of H(x, x ′). As Wald (1994) shows, specifying
four desirable properties for 〈ξ |Tab|ξ 〉 leads to constraints on H(x, x ′); roughly, the
upshot is that H(x, x ′) is singular for null-related points but well-defined for other
points (it is “locally weakly Hadamard”). The Hadamard condition limits physically
admissible states to those whose two-point functions 〈ξ |ϕ(x)ϕ(x ′)|ξ 〉 have the same
singularity structure as H(x, x ′).
KRW’s result shows that in a neighborhood of a base point of a compactly generated
Cauchy horizon there is no way to consistently define a Hadamard state. The set of base
points B is defined as the set of points p which are past terminal accumulation points
for some null geodesic generator γ of H+()—intuitively, γ continually re-enters
47 Cramer and Kay (1996) generalize the KRW result slightly to cover Sushkov’s example; H+() is not
compactly generated in four-dimensional Misner spacetime considered by Sushkov, but the KRW result
applies to any manifold which is the product of an n-dimensional spacetime with a compactly generated
Cauchy horizon and a (4 − n)-dimensional Riemannian manifold.
48 For a Klein–Gordon field, for example, Tab = ∇aϕ∇bϕ − 12 gab(∇c∇cϕ + m2ϕ2).
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any given neighborhood of the point p.49 (In the case of the Misner spacetime of the
preceding section, every point of H+() is a base point.) KRW prove that
Lemma 1 (a) When H+() is compactly generated, B 	= ∅. (b) For any globally
hyperbolic neighborhood U of a base point, there are points y, z ∈ U ∩ D+() such
that y and z are connected by a null geodesic in M, gab but cannot be connected by
a null curve lying entirely in U .
(The reader should verify property (b) for the case of Misner spacetime.) Because of
the clash between the local and global senses of null-related points and because the
singularity structure of a Hadamard state depends on which points are null related,
the point splitting procedure fails to yield a well-defined value for 〈ξ |Tab|ξ 〉 at a base
point.50
It is expected that analogous results hold for cases where H+() is not compactly
generated but serves as a chronology horizon in the sense that it separates the ini-
tially globally hyperbolic region D+() from a region where there are CTCs (see
Cramer and Kay 1996; KRW 1997). The collection of such results promises to serve
as a basis for a general chronology protection theorem to the effect that the laws of
physics prevent the formation of CTCs in a spacetime initially free of causal anom-
alies, whether or not the formation can be attributed to a time machine. But exactly
how is this promise to be realized? The original idea was that because the expectation
value of the stress-energy tensor “blows up” as the chronology horizon is approached,
backreaction effects shut down the incipient formation of CTCs. That idea, to repeat,
has been shot down by a number of counterexamples. The new approach, while much
more rigorous, is explanatorily less satisfying in that it doesn’t provide a mechanism
for preventing the formation of CTCs; rather it proceeds by showing that, under such-
and-such conditions, the formation of CTCs is inconsistent with the applicability of
SCQG, which requires that expectation value of the stress-energy tensor be well-
defined on H+(). As is often the case with reductio arguments, this reductio leaves
the beholder searching for the explanatory force.
Visser (1997, 2003) has argued that the situation is even worse because the chronol-
ogy horizon lies beyond the “reliability horizon,” which marks the limit beyond which
SCQG cannot be reliably applied. The “unreliable region”  consists of points con-
nected to themselves by spacelike geodesics shorter than the Planck length
(ca. 10−45m), and the reliability horizon is the boundary of J+(). The existence
of these closed Planck scale loops spell disaster for SCQG because the mode sum
for a quantum field defined over a region with such periodic spatial identifications
will include momentum terms on the order of the Planck energy. These energies and
49 More precisely, a past terminal accumulation point of a curve γ : I → M, I ⊂ R, is defined as a point
p ∈ M such that for every open neighborhood N (p) and every s ∈ I , ∃(s′ ∈ I : s′ > s & γ (s′) ∈ N (p)],
where γ is parametrized so as to be past directed. Since the null geodesic generators of H+() are past
inextendible, for every base point there is a null curve which intersects any given neighborhood of that point
more than once. Thus, strong causality fails at each base point.
50 The no-go result also relies on the propagation of singularities theorem which says, very roughly, that
singularities in a bi-solution to the Klein–Gordon field equation for nearby points on a null geodesic are
propagated along the entire geodesic.
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associated metric fluctuations are great enough that we should not trust SCQG to give
an accurate rendering of backreaction effects.
The summing up of this section echoes that of the previous section: while results
from SCQG reveal problematic features of attempts to implement time machines or,
more generally, violations of chronology protection, they do not add up to impossibility
proofs.
6 No-go results from quantum field theory on curved spacetime
If SCQG is a kind of first order approximation to full quantum gravity, then quantum
field theory (QFT) on curved spacetime is a 0th order approximation: it has no ambi-
tion to compute backreaction effects; rather, a spacetime of classical GTR is treated
as a fixed background on which one attempts to do QFT. There is a general recipe for
cooking up a natural algebra of observables A(M, gab) for a linear quantum field ϕ
defined over a globally hyperbolic spacetime M, gab (see Wald 1994). The result of
this recipe is a C∗-algebra generated by the elements representing “smeared” quantum
fields ϕ( f ), where f belongs to a suitable “test function” space.51 This procedure for
constructing a QFT on curved spacetime breaks down for non-globally hyperbolic
spacetimes, and one can wonder whether it is even possible to construct a decent QFT
when the spacetime is so causally ill-behaved as to contain CTCs and time machines.
This opens the door for another approach to proving chronology protection theorems;
namely, state and defend as minimally necessary a condition that a spacetime must
satisfy in order to admit a decent QFT; then show that if a spacetime is initially free
of CTCs, it can develop CTCs only at the price of violating said minimally necessary
condition.
Kay (1992) has argued that a requirement he dubs F-quantum compatibility is just
such a minimally necessary condition. To explain it, note first that even if a spacetime
M, gab fails to be globally hyperbolic, it is still possible to choose for any p ∈ M a
globally hyperbolic neighborhood U ⊂ M, i.e. U , gab|U considered as a spacetime
in its own right is globally hyperbolic. One can then proceed per usual to construct
the intrinsic algebra A(U , gab|U ) for this spacetime. But another possible choice of
an algebra associated with U is the algebra A(M, gab;U) induced on U by the global
algebra A(M, gab).52 M, gab is said to satisfy F-locality with respect to a given
A(M, gab) just in case for every p ∈ M there is a globally hyperbolic neighborhood
U such that the algebras A(U , gab|U ) and A(M, gab;U) are isomorphic. And M, gab
is said to be F-quantum compatible just in case it admits a global algebra A(M, gab)
with respect to which it is F-local.
In order to relate F-locality to chronology protection we need to be more specific
about how the algebras are constructed. Here we restrict attention to a scalar quan-
tum field ϕ satisfying the Klein–Gordon equation (g − m2)ϕ = 0, where g is the
51 E.g. C∞0 (M) (i.e. smooth functions with compact support on M). The smeared field is defined by
ϕ( f ) := ∫M ϕ(x) f (x)η, where η is the volume element for the spacetime.
52 A(M, gab;U) is the C∗-completion of the set of all A(M, gab)(O) for which the closure of the open
set O is contained in U , and A(M, gab)(O) is the subalgebra of A(M, gab) generated by the smeared
fields on M with f ∈ C∞0 (O).
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Laplace–Beltrami operator with respect to the metric gab and m ≥ 0 is the mass of the
field. When M, gab is globally hyperbolic, A(M, gab) is taken to be the C∗-algebra
of smeared quantum fields satisfying the following conditions (KRW 1997):
1. ϕ( f ) = ϕ( f )∗
2. ϕ(λ1 f1 + λ2 f2) = λ1ϕ( f1) + λ2ϕ( f2)
3. ϕ((g − m2) f ) = 0
4. [ϕ( f1), ϕ( f2)] = i( f1, f2)
where  is the advanced-minus-retarded fundamental solution to the Klein–Gordon
equation. The existence and uniqueness of  is guaranteed for globally hyperbolic
spacetimes. This guarantee fails when the spacetime is not globally hyperbolic. Never-
theless one can construct for any globally hyperbolic neighborhood U the C∗-algebra
of smeared fields such that condition 4 holds for f1, f2 ∈ C∞0 (U) with  replaced by
|U , the advanced-minus-retarded fundamental solution for U , gab|U .
Now consider a spacetime where H+() is compactly generated. We know from the
Lemma of the previous section that the set B ⊂ H+() of base points is non-empty.
Let U be any globally hyperbolic neighborhood of a base point. Then the restrictions
of A(U , gab|U) and of A(D+(), gab|D+()) to U ∩ D+() cannot coincide, as fol-
lows from the Lemma. It is a basic property of  that it vanishes for spacelike related
points, whereas it is singular for null related points. Thus, |U and |D+() cannot
coincide when U is a globally hyperbolic neighborhood of a base point. This shows that
the usual field algebra defined above for initially globally hyperbolic region D+()
cannot be extended in any way so as to satisfy F-locality on a compactly generated
H+(). Under some extra mild technical assumptions KRW (1997) show addition-
ally that there is no field algebra at all that satisfies F-locality on H+() when it is
compactly generated.
In assessing the significance of these results for chronology protection, it is worth
noting that F-locality is not incompatible with time travel per se: there are spacetimes
that contain CTCs but are F-quantum compatible—the spacetime of Fig. 1 being just
such a case (see Kay 1992 and Fewster and Higuchi 1996). But F-locality is incom-
patible with the development of CTCs by means of a process that produces compactly
generated H+() or, more generally, a H+() containing base points with the prop-
erty (b) of the Lemma. This is a chronology protection result, albeit of limited scope.
If Hawking’s condition of a compactly generated H+() were a necessary condition
for the operation of a time machine then the demonstrated incompatibility would be a
completely general no-go result for time machines in QFT on classical general relativ-
istic spacetimes. But as we have seen, there is reason to doubt that Hawking’s ansatz
plays this role.
Apart from issues of scope, the main worry about the effectiveness of the dem-
onstrated incompatibility as a chronology protection theorem revolves around the
status of F-locality. Most directly, one can worry whether F-locality constitutes a
sine qua non for QFT. Krasnikov (1999) has argued that a modified F-locality con-
dition is perfectly compatible with the existence of a compactly generated Cauchy
horizon. If his argument is correct, then the constraint on spacetime structure illus-
trated by the KRW results merely indicate that the F-locality condition includes
what Krasnikov calls an “arbitrary requirement” responsible for the non quantum
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compatibility of spacetimes with compactly generated Cauchy horizons. As it stands,
however, Krasnikov’s modified F-locality condition is not an adequate replacement
for F-locality since it focuses on defining a field algebra over the union of globally
hyperbolic subsets of a manifold rather than over the entire manifold.53 This leaves
out precisely those parts of the manifold where F-locality is a substantial requirement!
Friedman (1997) has also suggested a weaker version of a locality principle: instead
of requiring that there is a global algebra which satisfies the F-locality condition, he
considers a set of local C∗-algebras with suitable overlap conditions. However, Fried-
man’s considerations are limited to strongly causal spacetimes, and it is not clear that
extending his approach to spacetimes with Cauchy horizons will lead to a condition
weaker than F-locality. Although this is a subject for further research, as of yet there
is no suitable replacement for F-locality which avoids the KRW result.
The results on the incompatibility of F-locality and the development of CTCs does
not furnish a mechanism that explains how Nature prevents the formation of CTCs.
Presumably that mechanism will have to come from the full theory of quantum gravity
of which QFT on curved spacetime is only a 0th order approximation. For sake of argu-
ment assume that the sought after quantum theory of gravity has a semi-classical limit
in which QFT on curved spacetime emerges as the interaction between the quantized
matter fields and the metric is turned off. Why should one think that this limit will
always obey F-locality? Kay writes: “One also expects that, if full quantum gravity
satisfies a set of local laws, then some remnant of this locality would survive at the
semiclassical level and it seems worthwhile to anticipate what this might be” (1992,
171–172). In the absence of even a dim view of the sought after theory of quantum
gravity it is not clear why the antecedent should be realized, or why, if it is realized,
the semi-classical limit of quantum gravity will conform to F-locality. Still, there is
an interesting implication to be drawn from trying to suppose that F-locality fails.
Suppose that we live in a world that can be described by QFT on a curved spacetime
of GTR, and suppose further that this world contains a time machine whose operation
involves the existence of base points in H+(). Then in principle we would be able
to detect the fact that we live in such a world by observing that commutativity fails,
[ϕ( f1), ϕ( f2)] 	= 0, even when the supports of f1 and f2 are relatively spacelike when
viewed from within the local spacetime regions we inhabit (see Kay et al. 1997).
7 No-go results from Euclidean quantum gravity
Cassidy and Hawking (1998) have argued that Euclidean methods provide a “probabi-
listic” chronology protection result. The ambitions of the Euclidean approach extend
53 Krasnikov distinguishes globally hyperbolic subsets from intrinsically globally hyperbolic subsets: a
subset N ⊂ M of a spacetime M, gab is globally hyperbolic iff (i) ∀p, q ∈ N , (J+(p) ∩ J−(q)) ⊂ N
and (ii) strong causality holds in N , whereas N is intrinsically globally hyperbolic iff N , gab|N is a
globally hyperbolic spacetime. The difference between the two lies in the importance of M − N : strong
causality fails in N if a CTC (or almost-CTC) loops through M − N and returns to N , but such a set will
still be intrinsically globally hyperbolic. The union of globally hyperbolic subsets excludes the chronology
violating regions, whereas the union of intrinsically globally hyperbolic subsets can cover a chronology
violating spacetime.
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beyond those of either QFT on curved spacetimes or the semi-classical approach:
techniques borrowed from the path integral formulation of QFT are used to study “full
quantum gravity” effects, ranging from the initial singularity to black hole evapora-
tion.54 In QFT path integrals are used to calculate the amplitude for a transition from
one field configuration to another. These are often mathematically more well-behaved
in Euclidean space (obtained by replacing t with −i t in global inertial coordinates)
than in Lorentz-signature spacetime, so field theorists frequently use Euclidean path
integrals and then analytically continue the relevant functions back to Minkowski
space to find S-matrix elements and the like. The Euclidean approach focuses on path
integrals like those from QFT, such as that for gravity coupled to a scalar field ϕ:55
Z(M) =
∫
dµ(gab)d(ϕ) exp(−SE [gab, ϕ]).
The analog of the “t → −i t” trick in curved space is to replace a Lorentzian metric with
a Riemannian metric; the path integral extends over the space of all Riemannian met-
rics defined over the manifold M. In some cases it is possible to analytically continue
the Riemannian metric back into a Lorentzian one to calculate physical quantities.
There are a number of difficulties in interpreting the quantity Z(M). The tricks for
handling the measure over field configurations in perturbative calculations in QFT do
not immediately extend to this case, and there is no general definition for the measures
dµ(gab) and d(ϕ). The interpretation of the “wave function of the universe” [hi j ],
a complex-valued functional on the space of metrics hi j defined on 3-dimensional
manifolds, is contentious; it is not clear whether [hi j ] can be interpreted as a “prob-
ability amplitude” by analogy with QFT. Following the familiar Born rule, suppose
we take
∫
R |[hi j ]|2dµ(hi j ) to be the probability that the three-geometry of the uni-
verse falls within a range of values “R”. This “naïve interpretation” faces a number of
obstacles.56 What does it mean to say that the universe has a given three-geometry on
a surface , without specifying a time when this geometry obtains? In addition, there
is no guarantee that the dynamical evolution of  has properties that would make it
possible to interpret these probabilities as being somehow related to a curve through
the space of allowed metrics. The Hartle–Hawking “no boundary” proposal interprets
these probabilities as follows: define the ground state wave function(al) of the uni-
verse (hi j , ϕ0, ) as a sum of Z(M) ranging over compact Euclidean manifolds
that have a unique boundary , with induced metric hi j and field configuration ϕ0.
54 Our comments here about the Euclidean program will be brief; for a careful and thorough assessment of
the thorny interpretational issues, see Isham and Butterfield (1999). For a collection of papers introducing
the technical apparatus of the Euclidean approach, see Gibbons and Hawking (1993).
55 The Euclidean action for general relativity coupled to a scalar field is given by
















where h := det(hi j ), hi j being the spatial metric of the boundary of M, written ∂M; K is the trace of the
extrinsic curvature of ∂M; and L(ϕ) is the Lagrangian of the scalar field.
56 The term is borrowed from Unruh and Wald (1989), who also discuss the difficulties with two other less
naïve attempts to introduce probabilities.
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The probability calculated using this ground state is interpreted as the probability for
the Universe (with an initial spatial geometry , hi j ) to “appear from nothing” (Hartle
and Hawking 1983).
The Euclidean approach is an initially promising way to study spacetimes with
CTCs since some of these spacetimes have well-behaved Euclidean analytic continu-
ations and the approach applies to non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes. Cassidy and
Hawking (1998) give a no-go result based on applying the Euclidean approach to a fixed
background spacetime. In particular, they study scalar fields with finite temperature
on background spacetimes constructed as analytic continuations of periodic Euclid-
ean spaces; i.e., flat Euclidean space with points identified under discrete isometries.
These spaces are equivalent to an Einstein universe rotating around some fixed axis; as
the rotation rate increases, at a critical value points sufficiently far from the axis rotate
faster than c. In the original space, the critical value of the boost parameter corresponds
to the formation of CTCs. The path integral for the scalar field diverges to infinity at
the critical value. At first blush, this result seems to indicate that acausal spacetimes
would be incredibly probable according to the no boundary proposal. But an analogy
with thermodynamics suggests that a different quantity should be interpreted as the
true amplitude: Hawking and Cassidy calculate the entropy of the scalar field, and
interpret their result as implying that the density of quantum states tends to zero. This
result indicates that the quantum states that would be associated with a chronology
violation simply are not available.
Results along these lines could provide a broad basis for chronology protection.
They extend more broadly than previous results, since they would outlaw CTCs and
not just time machines. But we have two reasons for thinking that the case is not
closed. The first relates to the vexed issue of interpreting path integrals and associ-
ated probabilities in this setting. We mentioned some of the difficulties associated
with probabilities in the Euclidean program above. Cassidy and Hawking’s (1998)
introduction of thermodynamic considerations muddies the waters further: Can their
considerations be consistently combined with assignments of probabilities based on
the no-boundary proposal, or do they come into play only in case of divergences?
Second, does every acausal spacetime have a Euclidean section? If the answer is no,
as we conjecture, the Euclidean techniques do not apply across the board. At best this
approach would give a plausibility argument that quantum effects prevent CTCs in
spacetimes outside its domain of applicability.
8 Conclusion
The physics literature on time machines has evolved in the absence of any precise
delineation of the spacetime structure that would characterize the operation of these
devices. This seemingly scandalous situation is partly explained by the combination
of the facts that most of the physics literature is aimed at producing no-go results
and that most of the contributors to the literature have accepted Hawking’s dictum
that compactly generated Cauchy horizons are a necessary feature of the operation of
time machines. Since this dictum is questionable, so are the effectiveness of the no-go
results based on it. But, to put a better face on the endeavor, what has become known as
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the time machine literature in physics can be construed as an investigation of the pros-
pects of achieving no-go results showing that, under physically reasonable conditions,
CTCs cannot develop in spacetimes initially free of these pathologies. Such chronol-
ogy protection theorems, if sufficiently general, would also constitute no-go results
for time machines, however the vagaries associated with such devices are settled. Our
review indicates that this sought after generality has not been achieved. At the same
time, the pursuit of chronology protection results has proved to be a fruitful way to
probe the foundations of classical GTR and the interface between general relativity
and quantum field theory.
Perhaps in the not too distant future it will be possible to discuss the implications
of a full quantum theory of gravity for time travel and time machines. But that day
is not here. Of the two most promising approaches to the sought after theory—loop
quantum gravity (LQG) and string theory—the former is closer to being able to claim
the status of a definite theory.57 Preliminary results indicate that LQG may be able to
eliminate the spacetime singularities that are generic among the solutions to Einstein’s
field equations.58 Perhaps LQG will also eliminate CTCs; but in its present incarnation
LQG simply ignores chronology violations since it aims at producing quantum gravity
by means of a canonical quantization of classical GTR, and this quantization procedure
is only applied to globally hyperbolic spacetimes. Nevertheless, CTCs might emerge
in the classical limit of LQG; but at the present time this limit is poorly understood.
Note also that LQG eliminates classical general relativistic spacetime singularities not
by replacing them with non-singular classical spacetime but by showing that the clas-
sical singularity corresponds to a well-defined quantum state that, presumably, does
not legitimate the use of a classical spacetime description to any approximation. Elim-
inating CTCs and time machines as a byproduct of eliminating classical relativistic
spacetime structure may strike some (as it strikes us) as less satisfying than a general
chronology protection theorem for classical GTR.
The study of time machines is a good opportunity for forging a partnership between
physics and the philosophy of physics. Of course, philosophers have to recognize that
in this particular instance the partnership is necessarily an unequal one since the math-
ematical physicists have to do the heavy lifting. But it also seems clear that a little
more cooperation with philosophers of science in attending to the analysis of what it
takes to be a time machine could have led to some helpful clarifications in the physics
literature.
Finally, at the risk of repetition, we want to underscore two points that have not
penetrated very far into philosophical consciousness. The first is that the physics lit-
erature on time machines engages a set of issues that are largely distinct from those
involved in the so-called paradoxes of time travel. More attention to the former by
philosophers could reinvigorate discussions of the paradoxes and related issues. The
second point is that chronology protection theorems are sufficient but not necessary
for showing that a time machine cannot operate; so even if the loopholes in the pres-
ently existing chronology protection theorems cannot be plugged, there remain other
57 For an overview, see Rovelli (2004).
58 See, for example, Bojowald (2001), but see also Brunnemann and Thiemann (2006).
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means for showing that Nature does not sanction the operation of a time machine. Our
preferred means would be to show that the Potency Condition cannot be realized in
physically interesting models of GTR.
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